Introduction<\/a> This issue examines questions of epistemology in the MAQ<\/em> archive from 1975 to today, exploring assumptions and interventions over what counts as knowledge, who is presumed to know, and how knowledge is understood to be generated by\/about\/with our interlocutors. Approaching this question laterally, I read the archive to ask how scholars have engaged, implicitly or explicitly, with thorny questions around knowledge, its margins and limits. Over MAQ<\/em>\u2019s half century, epistemological practices have been made and remade across shifting methodological frameworks, political commitments, disciplinary norms, and (bio)cultural assumptions. Situated by my own positionality, I focus on a comparatively small subset of themes and problematics. I attend to how reading the archive challenges us to think capaciously and reflexively about what knowing does<\/em> as a form of world-making, as well as what values we ascribe to ignorance and ambiguity, epistemic authority and delegitimization, certitude and incertitude.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The title\u2014\u201cKnowing Better?\u201d\u2014is something of a pun, asking both if we know better (or differently) than we used to and also if\/how we (presume to) know better than others. Meanwhile, \u201cEpistemological Bounds\u201d seeks to capture the nonlinearity of the archive, with \u201cbounds\u201d referencing both limits and leaps. For instance, one perennial epistemological tension is our field\u2019s relationship to biomedicine and its hegemony among diverse healing practices. As an example, Paul Unschuld (1985) interrogated traditional Chinese medical theory, arguing that it lacked the objectivity or universal applicability of biomedicine, thus being unable to treat \u201creal nosological units\u201d like Hansen\u2019s disease (leprosy). He averred that leprosy \u201cis \u2018real\u2019 in the sense that it is caused by a microorganism,\u201d has been identified in different cultures, and biomedical treatments \u201care effective regardless of the sociocultural background of the patient\u201d (5). Although Unschuld\u2019s piece provided a laudable rethinking of Chinese medical history, it also policed epistemic boundaries even while other medical anthropologists were demonstrating that biomedical treatments are culturally constructed and that sociocultural and political-economic background impact efficacy within as well as between cultures (in MAQ<\/em>, see O\u2019Neil 1989, Singer 1986; see also Gordon 1988, Martin 1987, Obeyesekere 1985). Thus, while significant epistemological bounds are evident in the archive, these were often slower, more fragmented, and less linear than typical historiographies suggest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Certain patterns emerge as generations of medical anthropologists have (re)thought what knowledge is, what it does, and how we should position our knowledge in relation to our interlocutors\u2019. One approach has been to critically interrogate epistemological assumptions, at times debunking others\u2019 erroneous or deleterious knowledge claims. For instance, Allan Young (1988) shows how psychotherapy\u2019s \u201cdemoralization thesis\u201d is just as much of a culturally-specific \u201cmyth\u201d as the various other therapeutic \u201cideologies\u201d it seeks to demystify. A danger in this approach is that anthropological analysis becomes the arbiter of truth, standing above rather than alongside other epistemologies. As I discuss below, this orientation has been challenged and dislodged by critical feminist interventions in the field. Today, medical anthropologists are increasingly turning a critical gaze back towards our own knowledge practices, identifying our own omissions and inequities. For instance, calling out dead zones in the medical anthropology of Africa, China Scherz (2018) argues that we have come to prioritize biomedicine, clinics, and global health to the extent of overlooking vernacular therapies and the \u201cother ways of healing, knowing, and being\u201d that they entail (543). Critically examining the epistemological commitments of our field also demands a recognition of persistent structural racism and coloniality, which contribute to the stark whiteness of the MAQ <\/em>archive. Much is lost and many epistemological injustices perpetuated in the absence of scholars writing from a wider range of positionalities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Recent scholarship in MAQ<\/em> has attended to the import and significance of inclusivity, in our own work and in medical research more broadly. For instance, Robert Lorway (2020) reveals how patients\u2019 involvement and activism has the potential to transform scientific practices. He writes about program and implementation science frameworks that combine medical research with healthcare delivery to produce \u201cliving laboratories\u201d (Tilley 2011) in which the production of evidence informs treatment and justifies health interventions to donors (see also Biruk 2018). Lorway specifically details how male sex worker activists in Kenya successfully prevented the \u201cundemocratic imperatives of an encroaching experimental order\u201d (2020, 398) that sought to impose biometric registration protocols at HIV clinics. He develops the concept of \u201cevidentiary politics\u201d to capture this entanglement, interdependence, and coproduction in which \u201cthe aims of surveillance science, health protection, and human rights development are increasingly confronting and reckoning with each other\u201d (416). Evidentiary politics may also be a generative concept for thinking about the entanglement of institutional priorities, political commitments, interpersonal obligations, and knowledge production in our own scholarship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Addressing another set of epistemological problematics, some scholars eschew notions of truth as representational, focusing instead on what knowledge practices do<\/em>. For instance, Thomas Csordas (1988) writes about \u201cdiscernment\u201d as a \u201cdivinely heightened intuition\u201d that allows priests to know others\u2019 afflictions in Catholic Pentecostal Charismatic healing in the U.S. (125). Part of what makes this religious healing efficacious is the enrollment of the afflicted in a reordering and changing of their \u201cassumptive world\u201d and its attendant possibilities (134). Knowing oneself differently also transforms the self. Other times, the production of knowledge serves political ends, as Matthew Kohrman details in his analysis of disability statistics in China (2003). Drawing upon Ian Hacking\u2019s work on enumeration (1990), Kohrman reveals how actors create the very categories and subject positions they seek to know. Finally, not knowing can also be generative, as Cristiana Giordano (2020) elaborates in her work on the \u201crefugee crisis\u201d in Italy. She argues that dwelling in the very limits of knowing\u2014by experimenting, exploring, and creating in ways that exceed recognized grammars\u2014may hold the power to alter our forms of life. Thinking with her interlocutors\u2019 artwork, Giordano approaches the space of the therapeutic as \u201can ethics of creation\u201d (92) that interrupts and suspends dominant categories and grammars via an \u201cexploration of the potentialities of life\u201d (78). Apprehending worlds differently opens up the potential for making worlds otherwise. All of these approaches refract through the MAQ <\/em>archive, settling loosely into three categories: Knowing and\/as Doing, Knowledge and\/as Ignorance, and Knowing and\/as Disqualifying.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Knowing and\/as Doing<\/em><\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In a special section of MAQ<\/em> devoted to \u201cperspectives on the placebo phenomenon,\u201d Robert Hahn and Arthur Kleinman laid out their argument that \u201cbelief\u201d can kill or heal and that this fundamental truth applies just as much to biomedicine\u2014\u201cthe predominant ethnomedicine of our society\u201d\u2014as it does to any other form of healing (1983, 3). However, they argue, due to biomedicine\u2019s \u201cphysicalistic and Cartesian ideology,\u201d the profession \u201csystematically obfuscates and stigmatizes this phenomenon\u201d (16). Their intervention was to assert that \u201cthe mind is embodied, the body mindful\u201d (18) and to highlight how all forms of healing are relational rather than merely a matter of discrete medicines operating on bounded bodies. Medical efficacy involves not just the object being given, but the interpersonal and relational act of giving it (17). Finally, they contend that medical anthropology needs a \u201cdifferent ontology\u201d in order to understand the complex interweaving of the \u201cchemical, physiological, conscious, and unconscious\u201d as simultaneous and mutually constituted components of any event (18). In this approach, knowledge is understood as embodied, relational, and enacted by a complex mind-body (see also L\u00e9vi-Strauss 1963).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Extending these insights, Emilia Sanabria (2014) writes about how women in Brazil \u201capprehend and negotiate distinction\u201d between different forms of contraceptives. In addition to brand-name medicines and generics, sixty-five percent of the pharmaceuticals in Brazil are other kinds of copies, known as similares. <\/em>Sanabria ethnographically followed \u201cthe differences among what is commonly presented as similar and the similarities that insinuate themselves in things presented as different\u201d (539). She demonstrates how pharmaceutical efficacy emerges as the \u201ccumulative effect\u201d of \u201cchemical, structural, economic, and semiotic elements,\u201d thus \u201ccollapsing the distinctions between biological and sociological factors\u201d (545). Knowledge is one component of medicinal efficacy: it \u201cseeps into the hormonal substance itself\u201d (551). At the same time, pharmaceuticals can also be tools for knowing bodies, as Andrew McDowell (2016) elaborates in his piece on uncertified biomedical practitioners in India who, forgoing diagnosis, experiment with different drugs to treat their patients\u2019 symptoms. As pharmakon, each drug administered reveals and conceals aspects of illness, a practice that also unsettles \u201cunidirectional relationships between knowing and treating disease\u201d (335; see also Etkin 1992, Henderson et al. 2021, Mol 2002). <\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition to challenging the containment of knowledge within the Cartesian mind, anthropologists have also emphasized how knowing is a storied form of doing. For instance, Parin Dossa (2002) explores storytelling in mental health treatments for immigrant Iranian women in Vancouver, Canada. Her questions were fundamentally \u201cepistemological concerns: what is social knowledge, how is it produced, and for whom?\u201d (342). She found that her colocutors faced structural barriers to social participation, including racialization, sexism, religious discrimination, and colonial perceptions of the veil, which compounded to render their past lives and identities (as professionals, mothers, and feminist activists) \u201csubject to erasure upon migration\u201d (353) to Canada. Yet, mainstream mental health institutions did not acknowledge these \u201cinvisible walls\u201d; instead, they placed the onus on the women to overcome so-called \u201ccultural barriers\u201d to integration. For Dossa\u2019s colocutors, storytelling offered an epistemological refusal of such \u201cdeficiency discourses\u201d by clearing ground and creating space for an otherwise narrative to emerge. Their own stories told of how systemic social exclusion disrupted Salamat-e Ruh<\/em> (roughly translated as \u2018the peace of one\u2019s soul\u2019), shifting the terrain from medical to existential and from expert to experiential knowledge. Dossa\u2019s article reimagines what health means and how it might be achieved by storytelling, as a form of knowing-as-doing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n More recently, Scott Stonington (2020) has explored knowing-as-doing in a U.S. cardiac intensive care unit (ICU). Here, doctors are not certain about diagnoses but must suspend this uncertainty long enough to \u201cmake moves\u201d as they intervene in urgent cases. Stonington calls this practice \u201cprocess certainty,\u201d referring to a temporary and constantly reevaluated knowledge about what is \u201ca good next thing to do\u201d (350). In a twist on previous work on the placebo, in Stonington\u2019s analysis, \u201cthe placebo is for the physician\u201d (357). Taking us through cases as they unfold at the ICU, Stonington shows how physicians must act \u201cas if\u201d they know, an epistemological practice that becomes \u201can act of creation, of making reality, because the patient\u2019s body changes as a result of interventions chosen\u201d (358). Thus, while Dossa reveals the power of experiential knowledge to challenge institutionalized truths, Stonington deepens this insight by demonstrating how expert knowledge is also experiential and enacted in situated practices. Across each of these articles, knowledge emerges less as something people have or hold, and more as a verb\u2014the active embodiment of specific practices, their emplacements, relationalities, and temporalities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Knowledge and\/as Ignorance<\/em><\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Medical anthropologists have also long been interested in the ways that knowledge practices simultaneously produce ignorance (see Last 1981, Littlewood 2007, Street 2011). This was even a point of contention in the 1983 MAQ<\/em> special section on the \u201cplacebo phenomenon.\u201d In Daniel Moerman\u2019s essay (1983) therein he asks why randomized controlled clinical trials are designed so as to exclude placebo effects, rather than to learn more about them in order to maximize them, calling this avoidance an \u201canti-epidemiology\u201d (15, see also Beecher 1955, Dumit 2012).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Decades later, Claire Wendland (2007) elaborated on this problematic, interrogating how the rise of randomized, double-blinded, controlled clinical trials (RCTs) have come to eclipse other forms of knowledge, including that of both clinicians and patients. She discusses how cesarean sections skyrocketed in the U.S. and globally due to a hierarchal ranking of medical knowledge, with RCTs taken as the gold standard and understood as \u201capolitical, scientific, and objective\u201d as opposed to the \u201cbias\u201d and \u201csubjectivity\u201d of experiential knowledge (219). Yet, as she reveals, RCTs are epistemologically and politically fraught in numerous ways: everything from what research questions are pursued to what counts as evidence are influenced by \u201cgendered ideas of nature, birth, and the female body\u201d (219). Excluded from evidence in cesarean RCTs is the mother\u2019s own experience of birth and complications, as well as the deleterious consequences that cesareans have for maternal-newborn dyads. And, when RCTs compare cesarean and vaginal delivery outcomes, \u201cthe most breathtaking move in the selection of evidence is that none of these authors considers the cesarean itself as injurious\u2026the intentional wound is exempt by fiat\u201d (223). Wendland\u2019s trenchant critique is directed at the \u201cinterpenetration\u201d of patriarchy, safety and consumer ideology, the institutionalization of birth, a culture of technological veneration, and hierarchal epistemologies. Offering a much-needed feminist intervention, she advocates for \u201csituated knowledge\u201d (Haraway 1988) that might displace the produced ignorance of standardized, universal knowledge claims, which, she reminds us, are always \u201cdominant knowledge disguised\u201d (226, see also Fisher 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sometimes the production of ignorance is actually the intentional objective of epistemological practices, as Peter Little (2017) reveals in his work on IBM\u2019s corporate mortality files. Drawing on Kim Fortun\u2019s writing on late industrialism (2012) and Achille Mbembe\u2019s analysis of necropolitics (2003), Little develops the concept of \u201clate industrial necropolitics\u201d as a way to grapple with legal-epistemological regimes that produce mortality and (fail to) document it. His article focuses on a 2003 lawsuit against IBM that led to the largest electronics occupational health study ever, carried out in Endicott, New York, at the site of a former IBM plant. After over a decade of waiting, plaintiffs received the study\u2019s results, which\u2014while demonstrating \u201cstatistically significant relations\u201d between disease and industrial exposures to solvents\u2014nonetheless served as a \u201cweak epistemic resource for those engaged in legal action\u201d (166). Legal and scientific regimes of truth conjoined to make the evidence ineffective: while the study demonstrated mortality, lawyers needed to prove morbidity; they also had the near impossible task of trying to prove that a given solvent was \u201ccapable of causing various illnesses and that it actually caused a particular client\u2019s illness\u201d (167). Ultimately, the study was not even used in the lawsuit and the case was settled out of court. Little contends that the production of more numbers, data, records, and evidence does not translate into greater health or epistemic justice, but rather forms part of \u201ca systemic effort to produce and disseminate ignorance\u201d (169). Under conditions of late industrial necropolitics, neoliberal science is an instrument of corporate power, an anti-epistemological technology for producing knowledge as<\/em> ignorance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet, ignorance may have its merits, as Jieun Lee deftly demonstrates in her piece on dementia in Seoul, South Korea (2019). Lee explores the labor involved in keeping a dementia diagnosis secret, concealing this truth from loved ones who are terrified of becoming a burden, being disgraced, and living in abjection (following the popular imaginary around dementia in Korea). In such a context, Lee argues that deception and secrecy can be acts of care rather than forms of epistemic violence. She uses the term \u201cliving with\/out dementia\u201d to capture the duality of remaining ignorant of the diagnosis while simultaneously being cared for and undergoing treatment. Lee carefully attends to how secrecy is maintained in practice, what kinds of labor this requires, and how it might open up new subject positions for individuals living with\/out dementia. We see how even institutional practices at medical facilities are refashioned as staff at Dementia Support Centers lead patients to believe that they are engaging in \u201cdementia prevention\u201d rather than \u201cdementia treatment\u201d activities. Dementia, diagnostic truth, and ethics emerge from Lee\u2019s account as relational and processual, operating in the interstices of \u201cconstant recalibrations and experiments\u201d (2019, 511). Rather than generalize about the value or harm of ignorance, concealment, and deception, then, medical anthropologists attend to their multiplicity and situatedness within local biologies (Lock and Nguyen 2010) and ethico-onto-epistemic formations (Barad 2007).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Knowing <\/em><\/strong>and\/as Disqualifying<\/em><\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Throughout the MAQ<\/em> archive, scholars also repeatedly critique the iatrogenic effects of dismissing patients\u2019 knowledge, whether in clinical care or global health initiatives. Writing on the experience of individuals with chronic fatigue syndrome in Boston, Norma Ware (1992) demonstrates how their illness experiences were \u201cdelegitimated,\u201d leading to escalating suffering, stigma, shame, and alienation. Ware\u2019s analysis offers an early critique of the epistemological limitations of mind-body dualism in biomedicine, where practitioners presume that, in the absence of an identifiable physical pathology, their patients\u2019 afflictions must be \u201cimagined\u201d and therefore either psychosomatic or nonexistent (352, see also Good and Good 1982, Kleinman 1988). Ware\u2019s participants felt trivialized, humiliated, and even paralyzed by this systematic disqualifying of their experiential reality, some attempting to \u201cpass\u201d as healthy. Meanwhile, Susanna Trnka (2007) details how Indo-Fijian women\u2019s pain is considered \u201cunreal\u201d by their doctors if it cannot be treated with painkillers at their clinic, \u201cwhereas the drugs\u2019 efficaciousness is held up as unquestionable\u201d (396). This example demonstrates how available medical treatments delimit which experiences are seen as credible or not. Taken together, such works caution against the caustic designation of \u201cnot real\u201d as a form of delegitimation that wields biomedical authority as an onto-epistemic weapon: for these patients, \u201cTheir shame is the shame of being wrong about the nature of reality\u201d (Ware 1992, 354).<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n Medical anthropologists have also levelled parallel critiques against our own epistemological practices, arguing that our scholarship needs to take seriously that which we cannot perceive (as real). A rather remarkable early intervention into these debates was Marlene Dobkin De Rios\u2019 provocatively titled piece, \u201cIs Science Catching Up with Magic?\u201d (1975). Dobkin De Rios contended that cultures vary in the respective emphasis and value they place upon different epistemological practices, leading to \u201cdifferences in modes of perceiving and organizing one\u2019s experience\u201d (5). She summarized literature on plant perception, hallucinogenic substances, human-animal relations, geography and environment, \u201cparanormal phenomena\u201d and \u201cthe supernatural,\u201d in some ways presaging the ontological turn via her argument that practitioners like shaman may have techniques for acquiring knowledge that scientific methods cannot apprehend. As she put it: \u201cpeoples steeped in so-called magical thought processes, which are disdained by Western scientists as non-rational and often inferior, may have been able to achieve a level of problem solving not yet reached by the Western scientist, perhaps because he [sic] asks the wrong questions\u201d (5). Importantly, Dobkin De Rios defends the epistemological validity of others\u2019 practices, refers to them as a form of \u201cknowledge\u201d rather than just \u201cbelief,\u201d and challenges the inequalities and hierarchies of onto-epistemological politics in ways that we are still grappling with today (see <\/em>Good and McDowell 2015, Luhrmann 2020, Roberts 2016).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, over the years in MAQ<\/em>, medical anthropologists have experimented with methods of writing and analysis that do not reproduce colonialist epistemological hierarchies. This commitment has been especially important in relation to one of the most pressing concerns of our times: vaccine hesitancy. Back in 2000, Pamela Feldman-Savelsberg, Flavien Ndonko, and Bergis Schmidt-Ehry analyzed a rumor that tetanus vaccines would sterilize women in Cameroon, a fear so pronounced that schoolgirls jumped from their classroom windows to escape public health workers and roughly one-fifth of those vaccinated intentionally tried to conceive afterwards to test their fertility, leading to an upsurge in pregnancies and abortions for the next two years (167-8). Feldman-Savelsberg et al. interpret these sterility rumors as a \u201c(subaltern) politics of the womb\u201d (173) that, while biomedically untrue, congeals another kind of truth. They show how rumor and gossip attest to the longue dur\u00e9e<\/em> of post\/colonial medical violence, female disenfranchisement, widespread mistrust of the state amidst growing ethnic regionalism, and international pressure to adopt family planning\u2014all of which compounded women\u2019s experiences of the vaccination campaign as coercive. Sixteen years later, Tamara Giles-Vernick, Abdoulaye Traor\u00e9, and Louis Bainilago (2016) also looked at vaccine hesitancy in Africa, comparing perceptions of hepatitis B vaccines in Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic (CAR). They forego terms like \u201cbelief\u201d entirely, in favor of an insistence that their interlocuters\u2019 understandings of health and wellbeing constitute a form of (incomplete) knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n I end with Giles-Vernick et al.\u2019s piece because it also brings together my foregoing discussions around ignorance and knowing-as-doing. Giles-Vernick et al. (2016) nuance notions of ignorance by explicating different modalities of what they term \u201cincertitude,\u201d which includes ignorance as well as uncertainty and ambiguity. They write that \u201cignorance\u201d may denote a situation in which people are unsure about what is possible or probable, whereas \u201cuncertainty\u201d captures moments when people do know the possible outcomes but just not their respective likelihood. Meanwhile, they understand \u201cambiguity\u201d as the existence of \u201calternative ways of knowing\u201d a situation and the ensuing disagreements over possible outcomes (205). They discovered such ambiguity over infant vaccination in both Burkina Faso and CAR\u2014with parents and health workers holding ontologically different understandings of personhood and wellbeing\u2014but this did not prevent vaccination as parents were keen to \u201chedge their bets\u201d by utilizing multiple forms of health protection (211). In CAR, however, ambiguity was compounded by uncertainties over vaccine urgency, as well as constraints in time and money, such that parents opted not to vaccinate their infants when \u201cimpediments to vaccination were more storied than the vaccination itself\u201d (216). Giles-Vernick et al. draw upon Tim Ingold\u2019s (2011) concept of \u201cstoried knowledge\u201d to capture how information that is not storied\u2014not experientially known\u2014leads to uncertainty over its truth value. Their article thus refutes the notion that vaccine hesitancy is driven by \u201cignorance,\u201d or a lack of knowledge, while also demanding a rethinking of knowledge itself as processual and enacted. Telling stories about infant wellbeing is a way of knowing-as-doing, much as Dossa (2002) wrote about. Understanding storytelling as a knowledge practice is also a valuable reminder of the importance of our own storytelling, pointing to why ethnographic narrative has remained the cornerstone of medical anthropology scholarship across MAQ<\/em>\u2019s long and storied archive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Is Science Catching Up with Magic? A Look at the Content of Belief Systems<\/a> | Marlene Dobkin De Rios (1975)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Belief as Pathogen, Belief as Medicine: \u201cVoodoo Death\u201d and the \u201cPlacebo Phenomenon\u201d in Anthropological Perspective<\/a> | Robert A. Hahn and Arthur Kleinman (1983)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Traditional Chinese Medical Theory and Real Nosological Units: The Case of Hansen\u2019s Disease<\/a> | Paul Unschuld (1985)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Suffering and the Social Construction of Illness: The Delegitimation of Illness Experience in Chronic Fatigue Syndrome<\/a> | Norma C. Ware (1992)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sterilizing Vaccines or the Politics of the Womb: Retrospective Study of a Rumor in Cameroon<\/a> | Pamela Feldman-Savelsberg, Flavien T. Ndonko, and Bergis Schmidt-Ehry (2000)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Narrative Mediation of Conventional and New \u201cMental Health\u201d Paradigms: Reading the Stories of Immigrant Iranian Women<\/a> | Parin Dossa (2002)<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Vanishing Mother: Cesarean Section and \u201cEvidence-Based Obstetrics\u201d<\/a> | Claire L. Wendland (2007)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe Same Thing in a Different Box\u201d: Similarity and Difference in Pharmaceutical Sex Hormone Consumption and Marketing<\/a> | Emily Sanabria (2014)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Incertitude, Hepatitis B, and Infant Vaccination in West and Central Africa<\/a> | Tamara Giles-Vernick, Abdoulaye Traor\u00e9, and Louis Bainilago (2016)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Corporate Mortality Files and Late Industrial Necropolitics<\/a> | Peter C. Little (2017)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Living with\/out Dementia in Contemporary South Korea<\/a> | Jieun Lee (2019)<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMaking Moves\u201d in a Cardiac ICU: An Epistemology of Rhythm, Data Richness and Process Certainty<\/a> | Scott D. Stonington (2020)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Experimental Entanglements: Surveillance Science, Sex Worker Activism, and Evidentiary Politics in Kenya<\/a> | Robert Lorway (2020)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pedagogical Materials<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Prepared by Laura A. Meek<\/p>\n\n\n\n Experiential Learning Assignment #1: Embodied Knowledge Project<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n For this assignment, students should select a health or wellness practice that they are interested in learning about and that they would like to put into practice in their own lives. This should be an activity that they do not already do regularly. Some examples include: vegetarianism\/veganism, acupuncture, yoga, prayer, sleeping routines, weight lifting, cooking, meditation, aerobics, guided breathing, massage, fitness tracking, scheduling breaks or naps, swimming, giving up alcohol\/sweets\/coffee\/etc., going for walks, limiting blue light in the evening, spending time in green spaces, journaling, stretching, or healthy eating. It is prudent to ask students to propose a topic early in the semester and to check that none of their practices might be harmful, dangerous, or illegal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The assignment comprises three parts: A research paper about the selected health practice; regularly engaging in the practice (with or without journaling); and a reflective paper contrasting one\u2019s experience of the practice with one\u2019s research about it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Research Paper:<\/strong> Students will write a research paper on their chosen topic, summarizing different forms of literature about it and its health benefits. They could review scholarly medical, psychological, and social science publications, as well as other media, such as newspaper articles, blog posts, magazine stories, or even fiction. This first paper can be as short or elaborate as teachers wish, serving as a short weekly assignment or a midterm paper, depending on course design. In the latter case, instructors may also ask students to contrast the different kinds of knowledge they were (and were not) able to learn from their various forms of source materials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Engaging in the Health Practice:<\/strong> After this first essay, students will begin doing their wellness practice, making sure to engage in it regularly (for instance, every day or every other day for at least a month). During this time, I encourage students to keep a journal detailing what changes they notice in their bodies, routines, sensations, feelings, relations, and daily lives. (This journal can be kept private and\/or just graded for completion.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Contrasting Paper:<\/strong> Finally, for the last part of this assignment, students will write a second paper contrasting their embodied learning with what they learned previously in their research assignment. The purpose of this second essay is to help students better understand the concept of knowing-as-doing. They may be asked to make connections to two or three course readings on this topic. Some guiding questions to use for this assignment are:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Knowing Better? Articles from the MAQ Archive<\/a>
Pedagogical Materials: Knowing and\/as Doing
<\/a>Pedagogical Materials: Knowledge and\/as Ignorance
<\/a>Pedagogical Materials: Knowing and\/as Disqualifying
<\/a>References<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nIntroduction<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Knowing Better? Articles from the MAQ Archive<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Knowing and\/as Doing<\/h3>\n\n\n\n